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ABSTRACT
Defensive alliances are a way of using graphs to model the defense of resources (people,
buildings, countries, etc.) against attacks where the number of potential attackers against
each resource is known. The initial study of defensive alliances focused on questions of min-
imal defensive alliances in a graph and the minimum possible size of a defensive alliance in
a graph, but in order to apply defensive alliances in modeling real-world situations, addi-
tional considerations are important. In particular, since each vertex in a defensive alliance
represents some real-world object that has a cost associated with remaining in the defensive
alliance, it is important to consider the value each vertex adds to the defensive alliance. In
this thesis we consider a method of assessing the efficiency of a defensive alliance, including
the special case of secure sets.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A simple, undirected graph G = (V,E) (hereafter referred to as a “graph”) is composed
of a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, where each edge is a set of two vertices. Two
vertices are said to be adjacent of there is an edge in E containing the two vertices. The
open neighborhood of a vertex v ∈ V , N(v), is the set of all vertices adjacent to v in G. The
closed neighborhood is defined as N [v] = N(v) ∪ {v}. The open neighborhood of a set of
vertices U ⊆ V is N(U) = ⋃v∈U N(v)−U , and the closed neighborhood is N [U ] = N(U)∪U .
A defensive alliance (sometimes abbreviated to “alliance”) is a set of vertices D in a graph G
with the property that for all v ∈ D, |N [v]∩D| ≥ |N(v)∩∂D|, where ∂D = ⋃v∈DN(v)−D,
the set of vertices in G neighboring D but not in D (referred to as the boundary of D). A
strong defensive alliance requires that |N [v] ∩D| > |N(v) ∩ ∂D|. [KHH04] A secure set is a
defensive alliance with the added property that every subset S of D has the property that
|N [S] ∩D| ≥ |N(S) ∩ ∂D| (this property subsumes the defensive alliance property, though,
and is sufficient for defining secure sets on their own). [BDH07]
A defensive alliance is minimal if it contains no proper subset that is a defensive alliance.
Similarly, a secure set is minimal if it contains no proper subset that is a secure set. A
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defensive alliance or secure set is a minimum in a particular graph if it is of least cardinality
among all defensive alliances or secure sets, respectively, in a graph.
Defensive alliances originated with the purpose of modeling neighboring countries defending
themselves from attacks by assigning each country to a vertex and connecting vertices when
the represented countries share a border. [KHH04] Other possible applications include mod-
eling the defense of a military compound, the guarding of the crown jewels of a country, and
the security of a museum. [Dut09] Although not explicitly considered in earlier works, each
vertex added to an alliance has a cost associated with adding the object it represents in the
real world, be it in terms of money, lives, or other valuable resources. Thus it is beneficial
to find minimal defensive alliances. But because we may find more than one minimal de-
fensive alliance meeting the requirements of the situation being modeled, we need a way of
assessing which of several alliances is “best”. To this end we want to consider the efficiency
of defensive alliances, that is to measure how well the defenders are utilized.
In this thesis we will consider the existence of “dud” vertices in alliances (that is, vertices
of at least distance 3 from the boundary of the alliance) and examine what they may tell us
about the efficiency of an alliance.
Note: For all notation not explicitly introduced in the body of this thesis, we follow the
terminology of West. [Wes01]
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1.1 Defensive Alliances
In 2002 Kristiansen, Hedetniemi, and Hedetniemi introduced the concept of defensive al-
liances. [KHH04] In particular they studied minimal and minimum defensive alliances and
defensive alliance number, defined as a(G) to be the cardinality of a minimum alliance in
G. They discovered several properties of defensive alliances that help us to understand their
structure.
Theorem 1. For any graph G = (V,E),
1. For any minimal defensive alliance D ⊆ V , the subgraph induced by D in G is con-
nected.
2. a(G) = 1 if and only if there exists a vertex v ∈ V such that deg(v) ≤ 1.
3. a(G) = 2 if and only if δ(G) ≥ 2 and G has two adjacent vertices of degree at most
three.
This tells us, for example, that for any tree or path graph, a(G) = 1, and for any cycle or
wheel graph, a(G) = 2. [KHH04] But since determining the characteristics of graphs with
a(G) = k becomes harder as k increases, they also give bounds on a(G).
Theorem 2. For any graph G or order n, 1 ≤ a(G) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋
.
3
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Figure 1.1: A graph with a defensive alliance that is not a secure set
This bound is known to be sharp, since a(Kn) =
⌊
n
2
⌋
, where Kn is the complete graph on n
vertices.
1.2 Secure Sets
The work of Kristiansen, Hedetniemi, and Hedetniemi lead Brigham, Dutton, and Hedet-
niemi to further consider the graph theoretic modeling of real-world alliances and noted that
defensive alliances might fail in a real-world defenses because the attackers could overwhelm
the capacity of the defenders to help their neighbors. [BDH07] Consider the graph in Figure
1.1.
In it, the vertex set {a, b, c} forms a defensive alliance, but does not form a secure set. In
terms of the model, we could say that a defensive alliance can defend against an attack against
any one vertex in the alliance, but not an attack against multiple vertices in the alliance.
To address this issue Brigham, Dutton, and Hedetniemi formally defined the meaning of an
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attack on and a defense of an alliance and used these to construct a stronger type of alliance
called a secure set. [BDH07]
Definition 3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. For any S = {s1, s2, ..., sk} ⊆ V , an attack
on S is any k mutually disjoint sets A = {A1, A2, ..., Ak} for which Ai ⊆ N [si] − S, 1 ≤
i ≤ k. A defense of S is any k mutually disjoint sets D = {D1, D2, ..., Dk} for which
Di ⊆ N [si] ∩ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. An attack A is defendable if there exists a defense D such that
|Di| ≥ |Ai| for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
A set S is secure if and only if every attack on S is defendable.
A subset X ⊆ S is S-secure if every attack on S in which Ai = ∅ whenever si 6∈ X is
defendable.
This definition of secure sets, while instructional in understanding the motivations behind
the design of the concept, is not very useful in proofs because it is cumbersome. Instead,
they give the following equivalent definition of secure sets. [BDH07]
Definition 4. A set S of vertices in graph G is secure if and only if |N [X]∩S| ≥ |N [X]−S|
for all X ⊆ S.
Because of the advantages of this definition of secure sets, in the remainder of this thesis we
will refer to attacks and defenses only informally to make clear the scenarios being modeled
using alliances.
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Similar to the bounds on the defensive alliance number of a graph, bounds exist on the
security number of a graph, defined as s(G) to be the minimum cardinality of a minimal
secure set in G. [DLB08] Much like in the case of defensive alliances, these bounds are
especially useful since s(G) = k becomes increasingly difficult to characterize as k increases.
Theorem 5. Given a graph G of order n,
⌈
δ(G)+1
2
⌉
≤ s(G) ≤ n−
⌈
δ(G)
2
⌉
.
This bound is not sharp, but no better bound has yet been discovered. However it is known
that there exist graphs for which s(G) ≥
⌈
n(G)
2
⌉
, so security number does not share an upper
bound with defensive alliance number. [DLB08]
1.3 Algorithmic Complexity
Intuitively the problems of finding defensive alliances and secure sets should be in the set
of NP problems, that is the set of decision problems where the affirmative instances can
be identified in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine, because defensive
alliances and secure sets are defined in terms of their subsets. For defensive alliances, the
problem is formally stated as follows.
Problem 6. DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE
INSTANCE: Graph G = (V,E), positive integer k < |V |.
QUESTION: Does G have a defensive alliance of size at most k?
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DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE is not only in NP, but is in the set of NP-complete problems
because there exists a transformation from the VERTEX COVER problem to DEFENSIVE
ALLIANCE. [Jam07] This means it is among the hardest problems that can be answered in
polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine.
Not as much is known about the same problem for secure sets. First, we define it formally.
Problem 7. SECURE SET
INSTANCE: Graph G = (V,E), positive integer k < |V |
QUESTION: Does G have a secure set of size at most k?
Currently nothing is known about the complexity classification of SECURE SET. We can
currently only say that no deterministic or nondeterministic polynomial time algorithms are
known for the problem, although special cases of the problem that restrict the structure of G
are known to be in NP and co−NP . [Dut06] All known algorithms that answer SECURE
SET require exponential time.
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CHAPTER 2
DUD VERTICES
In a defensive alliance, a vertex is a dud if it is at least distance 3 from the alliance’s boundary,
which is to say that a dud never defends itself or one of its neighbors from an attack. There
are two reasons we might include dud vertices in a defensive alliance. One is if the dud
is a vertex that must be included in the defensive alliance, such as when using a defensive
alliance to model the guards protecting the crown jewels, which we model by saying we have
a vertex set J in a graph G that must be defended. The other reason we might be tempted
to include a dud vertex is to keep it from attacking, thus out of the boundary. But, if our
defensive alliance is minimal, there is no need for any dud vertices outside of any that might
be contained in J , even if we require a strong defensive alliance.
The primary result of the paper follows.
Theorem 8. Given J ⊆ V (G), let D be a minimal defensive alliance that contains J . Then
there are no duds in D − J .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that v is a dud vertex in D − J . Then v must be at least
distance 3 from ∂D. Then for all u ∈ N(v), N(u) ⊆ D since no u is adjacent to any vertex
8
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Figure 2.1: A graph containing a minimal secure set with a dud vertex
not in D, from which it also follows that |N [u]| ≥ 3. Then in D − v, |N [u] ∩ (D − v)| ≥
2 > |N(u) ∩ ∂(D − v)| = 1, since N(u) ∩ ∂(D − v) = {v}, and since for all w ∈ D − N [v],
N [w] ∩ D = N [w] ∩ D − v and N(w) ∩ ∂D = N(w) ∩ ∂D − v, it follows that D − v is a
(strong) defensive alliance, hence D is not minimal, a contradiction to D being a minimal
(strong) defensive alliance, thus v does not exist and the result is proved.
Since the only duds present in a minimal (strong) defensive alliance are those vertices that
we have decided must be included, regardless of whether or not they were duds, duds do not
provide a very good means of measuring the efficiency of defensive alliances.
We see, though, that a minimal secure set can contain a dud.
Observation 9. Consider the graph in Figure 2.1. S = {d, a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3, b4} forms
a minimal secure set (that is, no subset of S is also a secure set), and d is a dud. Thus the
presence of dud vertices is relevant when considering the efficiency of minimal secure sets.
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This observation was verified computationally using the following Sage code, which is ex-
plained in further detail in Chapter 4.
G = Graph ( )
#arm 1
G. add edge (0 , 1)
G. add edge (1 , 2)
G. add edge (1 , 3)
G. add edge (1 , 4)
G. add edge (2 , 3)
G. add edge (3 , 4)
G. add edge (4 , 2)
G. add edge (2 , 5)
G. add edge (2 , 6)
G. add edge (3 , 6)
G. add edge (3 , 7)
G. add edge (4 , 7)
G. add edge (4 , 8)
#arm 2
G. add edge (0 , 11)
G. add edge (11 , 12)
G. add edge (11 , 13)
G. add edge (11 , 14)
G. add edge (12 , 13)
G. add edge (13 , 14)
G. add edge (14 , 12)
G. add edge (12 , 15)
G. add edge (12 , 16)
G. add edge (13 , 16)
G. add edge (13 , 17)
G. add edge (14 , 17)
G. add edge (14 , 18)
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#between arms
G. add edge (2 , 11)
G. add edge (3 , 11)
G. add edge (4 , 11)
G. add edge (12 , 1)
G. add edge (13 , 1)
G. add edge (14 , 1)
S = Set ( [ 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 1 4 ] )
p r i n t min imum secure s e t s in subse t (G, S)
Which output that S did not contain any proper subsets which were themselves secure sets.
Let dudG(S) be the number of dud vertices in a secure set S in G. If S contains a subset J
that must be defended, J may contain dud vertices, so let dudJG(S) be the number of dud
vertices in a secure set S in graph G where dud vertices in J are excluded from the count.
Although dud vertex count is a new concept, we can say at least a few useful things about
it.
Observation 10. Let S be a secure set in a graph G. If the diameter of 〈S〉 is less than 2
or the diameter of G is less than 3, then dud(S) = 0. Equivalently, if dud(S) > 0, then the
diameter of 〈S〉 is at least 2 and the diameter of G is at least 3. Or, put another way, G
must contain a vertex of at least eccentricity 3.
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This observation follows immediately from the fact that a dud vertex must be at least
distance 3 away from any vertex in ∂S. This tells us something about the structure of a
graph that contains a minimal secure set with a dud vertex.
We can also see that a minimum secure set may contain a dud (noting that in Observation
9, a minimal secure set contained a dud, but the graph contained a secure set of size 1).
Observation 11. Consider the graph H, shown in Figure 2.2, formed as G from Figure 2.1
connected to the complete graph K17 with vertices in ∂S corresponding to any set of unique
vertices in K17. Then S is a minimum secure set of H that contains a dud vertex.
We find the minimum secure sets of H using Sage, continuing on the code from our earlier
example.
H = G
K = [ 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 ]
i = 0
whi le i < l en (K) − 1 :
j = i + 1
whi le j < l en (K) :
H. add edge (K[ i ] , K[ j ] )
j += 1
i += 1
pr in t minimum secure sets (H)
The output of this code tells us that any set of 9 vertices in the K17 subgraph of H form a
secure set, and |S| = 9, so all are minimum secure sets. But since only S has a dud vertex
count of 1, this demonstrates that even minimum secure sets may contain dud vertices.
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Figure 2.2: A graph containing a minimum secure set with a dud vertex
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In terms of a model, consider the example where each vertex in H represents a position on
a battlefield that a soldier might take up, and vertices are adjacent if they can attack each
other. In this case, both S and the sets of 9 vertices in the K17 subgraph are minimum secure
sets and can be defended with just 9 soldiers, but in S only 8 of those soldiers are actually
involved in the defense whereas in the other minimum secure sets all 9 are. Depending on
the situation being modeled, this might suggest S would be a better or worse choice than
one of the other sets.
For example, if one soldier is wounded, S might be preferable because the wounded soldier
could be place at the d position, but if no soldier is wounded, S might be a poor choice
because it will require 8 soldiers to do the work of 9 while 1 soldier sits idle. However, the
amount of work the soldiers have to do to defend each of the minimum secure sets in H is
not clearly defined, and we have given no means of comparing the amount of work required
to defend each secure set, so determining which of the minimum secure sets would be best
for the soldiers is an open problem.
14
CHAPTER 3
COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS
In order to effectively study defensive alliances, and especially secure sets, computer assis-
tance is needed to verify results that would take too long to do by hand since many of the
problems posed by defensive alliances and secure sets require O(2n) operations to answer.
[Jam07, Dut06] Building on the Sage mathematical library, we wrote the following functions
to extend the existing graph theory functions available in Sage to support computations
involving defensive alliances and secure sets. [Sag10]
Note that in many cases the functions could be optimized to generate results in less time
using less memory, and indeed such algorithms do exist. In particular, it is possible to reduce
the run time of the algorithms by applying known properties of defensive alliances and secure
sets to skip processing portions of the search space. [Dut06] But since we did not need, in the
course of this thesis, to deal with any graphs or alliances that were practically challenging to
work with given the inefficiencies of the algorithms, we left the functions inefficient in favor
of readability.
The first three functions do not deal directly with defensive alliances but instead provide
convenience functions for obtaining information for which there is no built-in function in
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Sage. In the future these will likely be rendered irrelevant as the Sage graph theory library
expands, but they were necessary at the time of writing.
# Additional Graph Functions
def closed neighborhood(G, X):
”””
Input: a Graph G, a set of vertices X
Output: the closed neighborhood of X in G as a set of vertices
”””
Y = X
for v in X:
Y = Y.union(Set(G.neighbors(v)))
return Y
def open neighborhood(G, X):
”””
Input: a Graph G, a set of vertices X
Output: the open neighborhood of X in G as a set of vertices
”””
Y = closed neighborhood(G, X)
Y = Y.difference(X)
return Y
def min distance(G, u, V):
”””
Input: a Graph G, a vertex u, and a set of vertices V
Output: minimum distance between u and any vertex in V in G,
returns +Infinity if u is not connected to V
”””
d = +Infinity
for v in V:
if G.distance(u,v) < d:
d = G.distance(u,v)
return d
# Defensive Alliance and Secure Set Functions
def is defensive alliance(G, S):
”””
16
Input: a Graph G and a set of vertices S
Output: true if S is a defensive alliance in G, false if not
”””
for v in S:
if (((Set(G.neighbors(v)).union(Set([v]))).intersection(S)
).cardinality() < ((Set(G.neighbors(v)).union(Set([v]))
).intersection((Set(G.vertices(v)).union(Set([v]))
).difference(S))).cardinality()):
return false
return true
def is secure set(G, S):
”””
Input: a Graph G and a set of vertices S
Output: true if S is a secure set in G, false if not
Note: This iterates through every subset of S, so it runs
in O(2ˆ|S|).
”””
P = S.subsets()
for X in P:
if (closed neighborhood(G, X).intersection(S)).cardinality()
< (closed neighborhood(G, X).intersection(
open neighborhood(G, X).difference(S))).cardinality():
return false
return true
def is minimal secure set(G, S):
”””
Input: a Graph G and a set of vertices S that form a secure set
Output: true if S is a minimal secure set in G
Note: returns true if S does not form a secure set, so you should
verify this separately.
”””
P = S.subsets()
for X in P:
if is secure set(G, X):
return false
return true
def secure sets within secure set(G, S):
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”””
Input: a Graph G and a set of vertices S
Output: a list of vertex sets forming secure sets within S,
including S if S is a secure set in G
”””
P = S.subsets()
SS = [] # list of secure sets
for X in P:
if is secure set(G, X):
SS.append(X)
return SS
def minimum defensive alliance(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a set of vertices forming a minimum defensive alliance in G
”””
V = Set(G.vertices())
VS = V.subsets()
VS.next() # skip empty set at start
for X in VS:
if (is defensive alliance(G, X) & X.cardinality() > 0):
return X
def minimum secure set(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a set of vertices forming a minimum secure set in G
”””
V = Set(G.vertices());
VS = V.subsets()
VS.next() # skip empty set at start
for X in VS:
if (is secure set(G, X)):
return X
def minimum defensive alliances(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a list of vertex sets, each a minimum defensive alliance in G
”””
V = Set(G.vertices())
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Q = []
VS = V.subsets()
found one = false
card = 0
VS.next() # skip the empty set at start
for X in VS:
if is defensive alliance(G, X):
if found one == false:
Q.append(X)
found one = true
card = X.cardinality()
else:
if card == X.cardinality():
Q.append(X)
else:
break
return Q
def minimum secure sets(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a list of vertex sets, each a minimum secure set in G
”””
V = Set(G.vertices())
Q = []
VS = V.subsets()
found one = false
card = 0
VS.next() # skip the empty set at start
for X in VS:
if is secure set(G, X):
if found one == false:
Q.append(X)
found one = true
card = X.cardinality()
else:
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if card == X.cardinality():
Q.append(X)
else:
break
return Q
def minimum secure sets in subset(G, S):
”””
Input: a Graph G and a set of vertices S
Output: a list of vertex sets containing minimum secure sets in G
that are subsets of S
Note: Used to get faster output when a minimum secure set is known
to reside in a particular subset of the vertices of G.
”””
Q = []
VS = S.subsets()
found one = false
card = 0
VS.next() # skip the empty set at start
for X in VS:
X = VS[i]
if is secure set(G, X):
if found one == false:
Q.append(X)
found one = true
card = X.cardinality()
else:
if card == X.cardinality():
Q.append(X)
else:
break
return Q
def all defensive alliances(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a list of vertex sets, each forming a defensive alliance in G
”””
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V = Set(G.vertices())
Q = []
for X in V.subsets():
if is defensive alliance(G, X):
Q.append(X);
return Q
def all secure sets(G):
”””
Input: a Graph G
Output: a list of vertex sets, each forming a secure set in G
”””
V = Set(G.vertices())
Q = []
for X in V.subsets():
if is secure set(G, X):
Q.append(X);
return Q
The code was checked for correctness in two ways. First, we verified that the code matched
the mathematical definitions, and second we further tested the functions experimentally
using known results. In all cases the functions presented are believed to be correct.
In our usage of this code, described in Chapter 3, the total compute time was approximately
three hours and required about 700 MB of process memory. In addition to techniques for
speeding up the algorithms, if needed, could have reduced the amount of process memory
used by changing the way Sage represents graphs. Currently, this code uses an incident list
representation of graphs. [Sag10] Specifically, a graph is stored as an array of edges, each
edge stored as a pair of integers, with integers used as vertex identifiers. If we switched to an
adjacency matrix or incident matrix representation of graphs, though, we could potentially
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reduce memory usage significantly, allowing analysis of larger graphs with less computational
resources. [Gib85]
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The presence of dud vertices, even in minimum secure sets, suggests that secure sets may
contain inefficiencies that can be addressed. Additionally, dud vertices are only one pos-
sible way of considering the matter of efficiency in defensive alliances and secure sets, and
since dud vertices do not appear in minimal defensive alliances, they do not even provide a
comprehensive tool for assessing efficiency in alliances. To these points, we end with several
open questions related to the efficiency of defensive alliances.
1. Does there exist a measure on defensive alliances (secure sets) that gives a useful
definition of efficiency? If so:
(a) Does the minimum defensive alliance in a graph also have maximum efficiency?
(b) Does the maximum efficiency among all possible defensive alliances within a graph
relate to other graphical invariants?
2. What is the smallest subgraph that can contain a secure set with at least one dud?
3. Does there exist a measure of the amount of “work” each vertex has to do to defend a
defensive alliance (secure set)? How does this relate to efficiency?
23
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